Values Matter

Thanks for this post, Matt.

For what it’s worth, John Tomasi and I, when explaining the differences between neoclassical and high liberalism, claim that high liberalism is a morally inferior form of the liberal project. Neoclassical liberalism and high liberalism share many features–social justice, respect for civil liberties–but high liberals do not give proper place to economic liberties.

I’ve discussed this issue at some length with Peter Jaworski, so I can’t take credit for everything I say (which will be scant as it is). It seems that libertarianism, modern liberalism, and liberalism more generally are all multiply realizable political philosophies. Take a ‘values’ input and an ‘empirics’ input and you’ll come up with some political output. In my view, neither the values story nor the empirical story will be sufficient to clinch the issue (this is, admittedly, strongly influenced by my commitment to naturalism). Further, it seems to me that our value disagreements tend to be more often shallow than deep. I often get the feeling that we argue over mere proxies or heuristics for the ultimate values we wish to promote. So, I think there is some truth to both positions, but it seems to me that focusing on reconciling the empirical differences would lead to a more fruitful relationship between libertarians and liberals.

I’m with Matt, not Fernando.

Libertarians think that our preferred policies will be best for the absolute welfare of the disadvantaged, over time, for some suitable definition of “over time.”

Many of our leftward friends think that, *even if this is true,* it neglects the importance of relative measures: relative equality rather than absolute advantage being important for civil solidarity, for the psychological well-being of the kinds of beings Adam Smith said we are, and for the stability over time of the absolute advantage (a highly unequal society at time 1 being one whose elites can use political power to entrench their advantage at time 2). The third is empirical, but only at the same broad level of generality as that libertarian “over time, for some suitable definition of ‘over time’” is empirical. (1) and (2) are broadly not– at least, if they are empirical, they are not subject to empirical decision by technical social science.

GA Cohen’s “Why Not Socialism?”, while not a statement of left-liberalism, serves as a nice illustration of the power of pre-empirical values questions. If market inequality is in some way necessary for human society, that is a sad, immoral, unjust fact about human society, on his account. It might be true. But its truth doesn’t make it attractive. I think that for many progressives something like “relative equality” and “solidarity” have some of that kind of status. And we have equivalents.

I think we’ve probably all got *something* like that lurking in our intellectual systems– some moral commitments that precede the empirical analysis. It’s not values all the way down, but it’s not empirics all the way down, either.

Is “bridging the gap” the best metaphor?

How about we just have a mutually-beneficial voluntary transaction instead?

There’s plenty of value disagreement within ideologies as well. Is the variance between classical and high liberals greater or less than the internal variance of either?

I also think that egalitarians, for reasons that I’m not sure about, tend to be more paternalistic. They tend to be less tolerant of other people’s choices. Again, I’m not sure why this attitude goes along with egalitarianism, but, in my admittedly unscientific sample, it does.

For a scientific sample, go download the GSS, which has plenty of good proxy variables for egalitarianism and tolerance of other’s choices. You might be surprised – the great majority of variance in political opinion can be reduced to a single left-right eigenvector covering economics and non-racially charged cultural issues. The next biggest is racial attitudes.

Other than this part I don’t think your characterization of egalitarians is particularly insulting or inaccurate, although I’d say that strong egalitarians are only a minority of US progressives.

So, sadly, I suspect that simply sitting down and looking at the data together is not going to bridge the gap between BHLs and progressives.  What would?

The return of throne and altar conservatism.

I think Aaron has the best answer. We need to come to terms with the fact that we have different ideas on what liberty, freedom, and equality mean. There is substantial overlap between the meaning of the word “freedom” as drawn from the lips of Frederick Douglass and from the lips of Milton Friedman. But they are not the same thing.

I think we have to start with a recognition that “liberty” is subjective, like “happiness”, rather than objectively measurable, like “poverty.” The value of liberty emanates from individuals, rather than arising from what laws are and aren’t in force. The idea of a multitude of theories of liberty that are each unique to one person should be appealing to tolerant, individualistic libertarians.

Likewise, liberals should be willing to accept a definition of “equality” that doesn’t necessarily mean “flatter distribution of wealth.”

Fernando, I don’t think that’s what Matt is suggesting at all. In my interpretation, he’s suggesting that when you try to show me that policy X frustrates value Y, I’ll say, “No it doesn’t. Not only is your evidence open to multiple interpretations, but you misunderstand what I mean by value Y. And besides, your favored policy S frustrates value T, which is of lesser importance but I don’t want to ignore altogether.”

pedrovedro: I agree entirely with Matt, and for the reasons he gives. I simply add this other reason to be skeptical about the chances of agreement.

I hope we all agree that if I support policy X in the name of value Y, and subsequently someone shows me that policy X frustrates value Y, then I should abandon policy X.

No. For the simple reason that just because policy X frustrates value Y, that doesn’t, in and of itself, mean that any other policy is any friendlier to value Y. Policy X could simply be the least bad option. Abandonment of policy X should be based on the proof that some policy A-W is better – that is, frustrates Y less than X does. Otherwise, all you have are people arguing against policies they disagree with, yet not attempting to advance any of their own, hoping to win be default.

Likewise, liberals should be willing to accept a definition of “equality” that doesn’t necessarily mean “flatter distribution of wealth.”

I’ve been thinking about this, and I honestly think that this is the last thing that you want. As long as liberals are concerned about distribution of wealth, they’re attempting to keep people engaged in markets.

I am new to this blog so regrettably did not get a chance to add my preference for a book to be read. I think it is one that liberals ought to read and libertarians ought to read … McCloskey’s Bourgeois Virtues and then the next volume, Bourgeois Dignity.

It is a trite summary to repeat her point – that commercial life itself inculcates the values and virtues that each of us hold dear. The beginning of the former book discusses the very thing these posts intend to discuss. No economics book has moved me as much as her two books have.

Roger3,

Your answer falls well outside and to the Left of the common sphere between left-liberals and libertarians that this site is trying promote.

wintercrow,

Your question is why I am a libertarian. I don’t want to force things on other people.

John V. said,

Your answer falls well outside and to the Left of the common sphere between left-liberals and libertarians that this site is trying promote.

So? What does popularity have to do with the truth value of the statements? AFAICT, the stated goal of this site is to increase understanding between the two groups. Understanding where you’re going wrong in the eyes of people who disagree is rather important, no?

It is indeed the case that markets are good for solving relatively simple logistical problems in a parallel fashion. Nobody, but nobody is arguing otherwise. However, markets have a limited domain of applicability: logistical problems that are amenable to simple evolutionary algorithms and all the benefits and problems that those algorithms entail.

It is also true that markets are horrible ideas for other portions of the overarching ideal of human ‘Well Being’. A market for parental love is a rather silly idea, no? Not “The opportunity to experience parental love,” that would be an adoption market, but the experience of parental love itself. There are a nearly infinite number of these very important but essentially unmarketable aspects to human Well Being and until Libertarians can address those, they should not expect to be taken seriously by well informed liberals because human Well Being is at the center of Modern Liberal philosophy.

Libertarians don’t have to convince the rest of us that the good parts of market driven processes are good. They have to convince us that the bad parts are tolerable. I’ll add that when I look towards permissive societies with moderate to large amounts of regulation I completely fail to see these huge economic problems that seem so obvious to libertarians. You know where I do see those problems? In societies with less regulation. The less regulation, the more unstable.

The libertarian economic argument essentially rests on the gamble that there’s an economic paradise on the other side of Somalia, and to be honest, I’m not buying it.

That said, I wouldn’t be here if I wasn’t interested in discussion.

Zyw, could you perhaps explain what your distinction between market and non-market? Also, what is the supporting evidence that Somalia is the path that libertarianism must, or even want to, traverse?

Last, Mike Giberson’s point has support from some of the experimental economics — could not site anything but sat in on a seminar years back that discussed the results.

Is it possible to hold as a value, “transfer resources from some” and expect it to not be viewed as evil by those with competing values? On the other hand, I would like to learn how those who do not share liberty as their highest value can claim that their values are being trashed by the existence of that opposing view?

Absolute liberty is not seriously held as a value by anyone other than sociopaths and Objectivists. For the rest of us, for whom tooth-and-claw anarchism is conceived of as an unsatisfactory for of social organization, it is uncontroversial to recognize that individual liberty is and must be constrained to the extent that it infringes upon the rights and liberties of other individuals.

Now, we can – and emphatically do – often disagree about where those constraints should be located and to what extent they should be enforced, and it is furthermore, I think, a reasonable position to regard any such as basically a necessary evil – but as members of an organized society, such constraints genuinely must be conceded as necessary, at least in principle – whereas if you actually do live entirely off the grid, then the entire discussion isn’t even relevant.

Moreover, property itself is not an intrinsic entity. Again, if you’re living entirely off the grid, the question of what you “own” isn’t something that’s ever going to come up. Property is defined by law, and it’s the law – not nature – that marks the difference between, say, “burglary” and “repossession” – or, more to the point, between “theft” and “taxation.”

That being said, the distribution of resources has been a core function of human social organizations for as long as we’ve had social organizations, whether that consists of direct appropriations by public institutions or the public protection and facilitation of resource transfer by means of private contracts.

My point, therefore, is that the socially recognized possession of resources is necessarily at least somewhat arbitrary, and, as such, is inevitably subject to contention. Property rights are socially constructed, and are therefore no more “absolute” than any other liberty and thus, as with any other liberty, may be legitimate subjects of constraint (as, for instance, those laws which “infringe” upon my liberty to break into your house and take your hi-def television).

“Transfer resources from some,” strictly speaking, is not in this context a value at all. It is, rather, an instrumental constraint upon individual liberty that serves (practically speaking) a value such as, for instance, ensuring that retired people have a minimal income (as in Social Security) or that poor people can get enough to eat (as with food stamps).

You can argue – as some people do – that the cost to individual liberty is not worth the benefit in social welfare, but that’s a basically subjective assessment, and it’s not the same thing as saying that liberty and social welfare are incompatible in principle.

M,

But they do. Maybe not intentionally, but by default certainly. I have read articles by and debated libertarians for years and not once have I ever heard a solution to a perceived problem that didn’t involve a market.

Markets solve a limited set of logistical problems, nothing else.

To state that “[Libertarians] want much less behavior to be coordinated through states,” is fallacious at best. Taking libertarian arguments at face value immediately shows the problem –

P1. It is the case that governments should not be involved in supplying goods or services that could be provided by a free market.
P2. It is the case that contractual enforcement is a market opportunity.
Q1: Therefore, it is the case that governments should not be in the business of contract enforcement.

That was the police I just eliminated. I can make precisely the same argument for any and every government service.

Now, here’s your problem:
Deny P1 and you’re flat out not libertarian.
Deny P2 and not only are you flat out not libertarian, you’re a liberal with a faulty understanding of the domain of applicability of economics to boot and now we’re just haggling over price.

The problem with the libertarian perspective is that by turning markets into a totem, they’ve failed to realize that for anything other than solving logistical problems[*], markets are lousy – really, really lousy.

[*] Notice that I didn’t say distribution, I said logistics. Markets are disturbingly efficient at concentrating resources – that’s where the least inefficiency lies, where everything is all in one place, controlled by one entity.