Comments on: Neo-Rawlsian Libertarianism: Two Principles of Justice for Bleeding Hearts http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/ Free Markets and Social Justice Mon, 22 Jan 2018 04:53:00 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.2 By: Quem são e o que defendem os Bleeding Heart Libertarians? – Rodrigo Rey http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-71661 Thu, 02 Jun 2016 14:48:51 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-71661 […] Flanigan, Gerald Gaus, David Schmidtz, Will Wilkinson e Charles Griswold. Alguns defendemversões modificadas do rawlsianismo, outros o liberalismo da “razão pública”, e outros têm uma abordagem mais […]

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By: Wayne_Spencer http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-57905 Sat, 21 Mar 2015 23:12:00 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-57905 This article stands Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” on its head. Rawls never mixed civil liberties with economic benefits. He deliberately separated them and made it clear that one could never trade away basic rights for economic benefits. I suggest that the writer either is deliberately distorting Rawls’ words or has never read “A Theory of Justice” at all.

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By: For the record: what I think about social justice and libertarianism | Fair Coin Toss http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-43045 Thu, 23 Jan 2014 16:31:09 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-43045 […] by Kant and Rawls, sort of like the “neo-Rawlsian libertarian” view described in this post by Kevin Vallier at  Bleeding Heart […]

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By: As raízes liberais-libertárias: Quem são e o que defendem os Bleeding Heart Libertarians? | Mercado Popular http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-39153 Sun, 10 Nov 2013 05:35:24 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-39153 […] Flanigan, Gerald Gaus, David Schmidtz, Will Wilkinson e Charles Griswold. Alguns defendem versões modificadas do rawlsianismo, outros o liberalismo da “razão pública”, e outros têm uma abordagem mais […]

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By: Dois princípios de justiça para liberais neoclássicos: liberdade e justiça social | Tabula (não) Rasa & Libertarianismo Bleeding Heart http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-35163 Fri, 23 Aug 2013 06:20:38 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-35163 […] VALLIER, Kevin. Neo-Rawlsian Libertarianism: Two Principles of Justice for Bleeding Hearts. 12/04/2012 –> http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-f… […]

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By: Property-Owning Democracy is Unjust - Rawlsians vs. Tomasi | Bleeding Heart Libertarians http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-25199 Thu, 20 Dec 2012 18:20:42 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-25199 […] I have argued elsewhere that John’s main two modifications to Justice as Fairness are defensible. I think its hard to resist the pull of his argument from “economic exceptionalism,” the claim that the same reasons Rawls gave us to show that we must make two basic economic liberties basic (freedom of occupation and the right to personal property), give us reason to make some additional economic liberties basic. Other contractualist libertarians have offered related arguments, such as Loren Lomasky and Jerry Gaus, though their arguments differ from John’s in deep and systematic ways. […]

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By: Bleeding Heart Libertarians = Left-Statists « Politics & Prosperity http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-18292 Thu, 31 May 2012 04:22:08 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-18292 […] And see also the numerous blog posts from Jason (here, here, and here), Kevin Vallier (here and here) and me (here, here, here and […]

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By: berserkrl http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-15916 Wed, 25 Apr 2012 22:45:00 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-15916 Moral theory broadly speaking will help shed light on the general permissibility of coercion. PRL comes into the picture when we’re interested in the authoritative use of coercion.
 
But if the only difference between defensive coercion and authoritative coercion — i.e., all that the latter adds to the former — is the moral obligation of others to do what the coercer is demanding, then we get two odd results.
 
First: my initial worry was that PRL would not allow people to defend themselves against innocently mistaken aggressors; but you said no, it does allow that.  But in that case PRL seems to have the opposite problem: it’s so lax that it doesn’t actually constrain people’s duties (or at least libertarians’ duties) at all.  Previously it seemed as though you were saying “look, non-PRL libertarians are prepared to coerce innocently mistaken people, and they should find that morally problematic.”  But now you seem to be saying that it’s fine for non-PRL libertarians to coerce innocently mistaken people, since that’s just permissible defensive (rather than authoritative) coercion; they just shouldn’t assume that other people have a duty to go along with it.
 
Second: if you grant that moral theory “will help shed light on the general permissibility of coercion,” then it’s not clear that there’s anything left for PRL to do.  For if that’s true, moral theory is adequate to determine the permissibility not just of defensive coercion but of authoritative coercion too. 

For suppose the non-libertarian tries to force the libertarian to do something — pay taxes, serve on a jury, whatever — and the libertarian uses force to resist.  If moral theory addresses “the general permissibility of coercion,” then it is competent to determine not just whether the libertarian is justified in forcible defense but whether the non-libertarian’s (initial and/or continuing) use of force is justified too.  But then it covers both aspects of authoritative coercion, and no further task is left for PRL.

Of course this result depends on the special fact about libertarianism that the only permissible use of force is to counter other force, so that issues of the permissibility of force will always come pairwise.  Maybe PRL would be needed to justify authoritative uses of coercion that are not also defensive.  But libertarians don’t want to justify authoritative uses of coercion that are not also defensive, because they don’t want to justify any uses of coercion that are not defensive.  So PRL seems like a solution to a problem that only non-libertarians have.

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By: Best of the Blogs: Where Next? | The Editors | Cato Unbound http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-15757 Fri, 20 Apr 2012 14:36:20 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-15757 […] Rawlsean is It, Really? Kevin Vallier suggests that we don't have to be very Rawlsean at all — the washing machine and the soufflé can perhaps sit comfortably across the room from each […]

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By: mchugh_alex http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/04/neo-rawlsian-libertarianism-two-principles-of-justice-for-bleeding-hearts/#comment-15690 Tue, 17 Apr 2012 20:07:00 +0000 http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/?p=2492#comment-15690 This is great! I think these considerations really pull out what’s best in Rawl’s philosophy without asking the bleeding heart libertarian to abandon as much of  their commitment to economic freedom as a purely Rawlsian philosophy would. I am a bit worried though.

Personally, the problem I have with Rawls goes deeper than the difference principle and maximin. His definition of reasonable, as being  determined by public will, strikes me as even more worrisome. Mostly because I think one can be a moral actor, and perhaps even a more moral actor than others, while defying that which is publicly accepted as correct. It seems to me one can and often should be a proponent of viewpoints that one CANNOT reasonably expect others to agree to given factors like dominant paradigms and harmful/dangerous norms. So while the “political liberalism” solution to the slavery question at the start of the United States would very much be what was decided on: deal with it later, I think this is not the standard we should hold ourselves or society to. We should expect more, and I think you only get that with a more robust consideration of the natural rights side of moral philosophy and a clearer primacy of these rights. 

So I would be worried about adopting the Rawlsian principles, even so adapted, because it seems likely to me that a “reasonable” scheme of “fair distribution” that would develop in a modern society that did not hold private property rights to be absolute,  may not be as palatable as hoped. 

I assume that what was meant was that such a consideration could be applied using our own conceptions of reasonable rather than Rawls’ but I’m not sure what that would be. Supposedly something more that just a natural rights consideration, but wondering how you define this without using Rawls’ standard which is in my opinion, rather pernicious. 

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