Here’s a link to one of my favorite papers, “Scepticism about Philosophy,” published in Ratio. Here’s the abstract:
Suppose a person who is agnostic about most philosophical issues wishes to have true philosophical beliefs but equally wishes to avoid false philosophical beliefs. I argue that this truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic would not have good grounds for pursuing philosophy. Widespread disagreement shows that pursuing philosophy is not a reliable method of discovering true answers to philosophical questions. More likely than not, pursuing philosophy leads to false belief. Many attempts to rebut this sceptical argument fail.
In short: If you were agnostic about philosophical issues, you should conclude, in light of widespread disagreement, that studying philosophy is more likely to make you arrive at false rather than true philosophical beliefs. If you equally valued getting true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, you would think philosophy is not worth doing.
Richard Yetter-Chappell has a thoughtful response here. He doesn’t quite object to the argument, but instead asks whether we should be worried about it. (In a longer but not published version of this paper, I say something similar.)