Two replies to Mike’s post below.
First, and less important: I am no longer persuaded that Locke’s “mufti” passage, or the general discussion of foreign princes, is meant to convey a general exclusion of Catholicism from toleration. This is how the Letter has traditionally been taught– Mike’s reading is the usual one. But I […]
When students first learn about Rawls’s difference principle, they often assume Rawls intends the principle to be applied directly to every transaction. I can’t accept a pay raise unless this somehow indirectly benefits full-time janitors. But Rawls doesn’t intend for the principle to work that way. Rawls thinks that rules–when they are properly internalized and […]
In my first post, I discussed the argument that there are no natural rights because such rights are too indeterminate. In this post I wish to take up another kind of objection. Taken together, these arguments show us what natural rights really are.
It is common to say that natural rights are those rights […]
A few weeks back, I posted an essay at Libertarianism.org arguing that property rights necessarily restrict freedom. I noted in that post that I thought that property rights enhance freedom in certain ways too, and promised to go into that more in a future post.
Thanks to a skirmish with David Friedman (my […]
First, I would like to thank all those commentators who responded to what I wrote in “Natural Rights and Natural Stuff.” Second, I would like to clarify or restate a few of the basic points that I sought to make in that contribution.
To begin with, I did not […]
What kind of external property rights are consistent with self-ownership?
It seems to me that once one acknowledges self-ownership, one cannot acknowledge any other rights unless those rights are themselves grounded in self-ownership.
How so? Well, the difference between rights and other moral claims is that rights are legitimately enforceable. So any limits that […]