Free Market Fairness (FMF) presents a fusionist theory of liberal justice, one affirming both private economic liberty and social justice. I call this market democracy.
In a symposium on FMF hosted by Critical Review, a new objection has been arisen against market democracy, the objection that market democracy sanctions class domination. This […]
It’s come up a number of times around here that my approach to questions of normative political theory is not what gets referred to as “ideal theory,” and indeed that I’m very skeptical of that approach. I talked about this kind of thing in my review of John Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness as […]
[Editor’s Note: The following is a guest contribution by Felix Bungay, a student at the University of Cambridge reading an MPhil in Intellectual History and Political Thought.]
When looking at contemporary liberal political thought, philosophers like Samuel Freeman and John Tomasi like to play up the difference between classical liberals, like Hayek and Friedman, and […]
In my last post, in my series on property-owning democracy (POD), I claimed that it is unjust because POD frustrates the realization of Rawls’s (unmodified) two principles of justice. But another more interesting method of showing that PODs are unjust is to show PODs violate a more plausible, modified version of Rawls’s two principles.