Philosophy and Politics

By Fernando Teson On May 3, 2011 · 42 Comments · In Academic Philosophy, Liberalism, Libertarianism, Liberty, Social Justice

Many political philosophers overestimate the importance of abstract principles for the design of institutions. Most issues of the day cannot be resolved by a sole appeal to basic principles. Whether we talk about healthcare, the economy, poverty alleviation, crime control, and even foreign policy, philosophical principles at best underdetermine results, and at worst are irrelevant. Yet many philosophers think that if they can just make the right conceptual distinctions and identify the right political principles they can select the best institutions, laws, and policies. Not so. Abstract moral principles are insufficient to explain the differences between good and bad laws. An adequate theory requires an appeal to consequences in terms of human welfare. A couple of examples will show what I mean. From Rawls’s difference principle (institutions should be arranged for the benefit of the worst-off) it does not follow that the state should force transfer payments to the poor: if a free market improves the poor as a class, then the free market is superior to transfer payments. From Ronald Dworkin’s principle of equal concern and respect it does not follow that we should have government-run universal healthcare: if a different system better realizes equal concern and respect, then that system would be superior. Yet many philosophers illegitimately jump from abstract principles to concrete institutional proposals. I think the reason for this fallacy is the anti-utilitarian bias of modern political philosophy. It is one thing to claim, plausibly, that maximizing aggregate welfare cannot be a paramount goal. It is a very different thing to claim, implausibly, that nonconsequentialist principles alone provide the answer to social and political problems. To be sure, abstract principles provide some important answers. For example, abstract principles alone tell us that torture is wrong, or that the government should not censor the press or kill people without due process of law. But most social issues are not like that. They require a careful calibration of competing interests and goals. In particular, they require accepting the kinds of trade-offs that abstract principles usually do not tolerate well. Suppose the government believes that everyone has a right to food and shelter, but it cannot provide both at the same time to everyone. The government perforce denies shelter to some in order to feed others. The proclamation of the right to shelter is empty; there is no right to shelter. Rather, the government addresses the incidents of poverty by making trade-offs between the various competing needs of the poor.

Such disdain for the utility principle leads many philosophers to a general disdain for things empirical. They get bored with economics, political science, and empirical studies (part of the reason is that they are not particularly good at it.) For example, when discussing trade, some philosophers don’t want to hear about the law of comparative advantages. They think that the general principle that we owe a duty of solidarity to all fellow citizens settles the issue. Related to this bias is the belief, held by influential philosophers, that the main problem in society is moral disagreement among the citizens (Rawls in Political Liberalism.) I think this is wrong: while of course there are genuine moral disagreements (abortion and euthanasia come to mind) most disagreements in society are empirical. I don’t know anyone who says that poverty is a good thing. Everyone believes that society must do something to alleviate poverty. The disagreement is about how to do this. Progressives think that coerced transfers are essential; classical liberals think that unhampered markets are better. To put the point in more technical terms: a particular moral principle can only yield a concrete institutional proposal in conjunction with an empirical premise. If the empirical premise turns out to be false, so will be the proposal

http://politicsandprosperity.wordpress.com/ Thomas

“Everyone believes that society must do something to alleviate poverty.”

Classical liberals, as you suggest, do not believe that “society” (whatever that is in this diverse, fractured nation) must do something about poverty. This classical liberal believe in free markets, on principle, and that free markets also are the best remedy for poverty. The remedy is both direct (more jobs, higher incomes) and indirect (more voluntary charity for the fewer number of needy persons).
Fernando Teson

Thomas: Yes. By “society,” I didn’t imply any state, coercive, or even concerted action. I agree entirely with you.
http://thegeorgist.blogspot.com/ Rob Ross

“Everyone believes that society must do something to alleviate poverty… The disagreement is about how to do this.”

I wish I could agree with you. I tell myself this frequently, and I base my political views on this premise. Unfortunately, I fear that this may not, in fact, be the case.

Most people may not actually care about poverty. That is, most people may simply be out for themselves and their close families, with little regard for anyone outside their immediate kinship networks. A cynic might say that your bourgeois lifestyle skews your perception of humanity.

http://millsrevenge.wordpress.com millsrevenge

I think what’s missing here is *willful ignorance*. In the USA, in particular, we have a tremendous capacity to ignore compelling evidence that run counter to our prejudices. See “birtherism.” Or the belief that the current tax burden is historically high.

Shaking people out of the comfort zones is the real challenge.

http://aaronmclin.blogspot.com/ Aaron

I think that the idea of moral disagreements is given short shrift. Many of the disagreements are moral in the sense that they are about competing moral priorities. If I feel that coercive action is a greater moral evil than poverty, I’m going to have a much different idea of appropriate policy than I will if I hold that poverty is the greater evil.

If is from here that I suspect the perceived “general disdain for things empirical” comes from. Consider: It doesn’t matter how many empirical studies I can come up stating that the re-institution of involuntary servitude would be good for the American economy. Even if I could come up with iron-clad proof that every single person in the nation would be better off, people’s moral sense would be outraged to the point that the idea would be a non-starter, and empiricism be hanged.

I think the actual conflict tends to appear when one group comes up with a solution that satisfies both their moral and empirical mandates. They become convinced that other people’s moral mandates should not be allowed to stand in the way. Allow me to borrow from this posting as an example: “From Rawls’s difference principle (institutions should be arranged for the benefit of the worst-off) it does not follow that the state should force transfer payments to the poor: if a free market improves the poor as a class, then the free market is superior to transfer payments.” Note that this does not distinguish between the relative merits of each approach, simply saying that “if a free market improves the poor as a class, then the free market is superior.” But is this still true if transfer payments result in double the improvement to the poor? If so, then we have an example where an empirical good (twice the benefit to the poor) is trumped by a moral consideration (free markets are better than forced transfers) which mandates that the lesser moral good be moderated to favor the greater.

Since few moral goods exist in a vacuum where they are independent of each other, it is moral conflicts like this that often drive policy disagreements.

John

“…people’s moral sense would be outraged to the point that the idea would be a non-starter, and empiricism be hanged.”

I wonder if that is true — see http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/may2000/pris-m08.shtml

I think a lot would depend on the terms that rule the servitude and what events would make the involuntary aspect apply. Last, some exit clauses/conditions would be expected, as you say it’s not the same as slavery (as most people conceive slavery to be these days).

Kurt

It doesn’t matter how many empirical studies I can come up stating that the re-institution of involuntary servitude would be good for the American economy. Even if I could come up with iron-clad proof that every single person in the nation would be better off, people’s moral sense would be outraged to the point that the idea would be a non-starter, and empiricism be hanged.

Except that this scenario cannot occur, because every single person would not be better off. Some of them would be slaves. QED.

Perhaps you meant “better off” in terms of some narrow benefit like income or material goods? But, obviously, in all such questions we are assessing more than simply material benefits.
http://www.firsttruths.com David S. D’Amato

Thanks for this post, Prof. Tesón. I’m constantly going on about a lot of problems you discuss here, and I posted a comment over at my own blog: http://www.firsttruths.com/2011/05/from-theory-to-practice-and-back.html
http://aaronmclin.blogspot.com/ Aaron

Perhaps you meant “better off” in terms of some narrow benefit like income or material goods? But, obviously, in all such questions we are assessing more than simply material benefits.
Which is exactly my point. (Thanks, Kurt.) I can empirically measure things like income, wealth, lifespan, child mortality, et cetera. But if you consider freedom to trump all of these things, how does one empirically measure the optimal level? We understand that in some cases, freedoms must be limited for the good of individuals and/or society – and that in some cases, they are “better off” for it; consider involuntary institutionalization, as an example. But do we base our decisions in this regard on purely empirical considerations, or by balancing competing moral strictures (in this case individual freedom versus protecting society and/or individuals)?

P.S.: Not all involuntary servitude is slavery. Which is why I didn’t use the term “slavery.”

Kurt

But if you consider freedom to trump all of these things, how does one empirically measure the optimal level?

Maybe not “freedom” which is kind of nebulous — but we can, for example, measure depression. As science advances we’ll actually be able to map people’s experience of various circumstances quite well. While these aspects of a social order are harder to empirically measure, they are measurable. Empiricism cannot be faulted for the present state of data.

Certainly, we can agree that for those areas where the empirical methods are presently weak, that subjective judgement calls will prevail and some gap between progressives and libertarians will persist. And, I would agree with the author that there’s no reason to act as if that gap is forever unbridgeable. In fact, an honest commitment to trying to bridge that gap is probably all that is needed to unite the various categories of liberal thought.

(As for involuntary servitude, the only real difference is the duration of slavery, which is notable but does not seem to me to be meaningful. It’s still a situation where the “employee” cannot quit.)

http://aaronmclin.blogspot.com/ Aaron

I don’t think that the gap is unbridgeable. But it is real, and I don’t think that it’s solely a matter of empiricism, either. When Mr. Teson says, “Everyone believes that society must do something to alleviate poverty,” I take him at his word, but I don’t believe that everyone assigns an equal priority to that goal. There are other moral considerations to be accounted for that appeals to empiricism are poorly suited to.
Carlos F. Véliz

I wonder how this analysis fits with Hayek’s theory of complex phenomena.

In their last works, Hayek says that government should follow abstract general principles rather than pursue apparently expedient social and economic policies that seek to make us better off.

As far as I can see, you argue here for the opposite: “Abstract moral principles are insufficient to explain the differences between good and bad laws. An adequate theory requires an appeal to consequences in terms of human welfare.”

If that opposition is true, you must confront the following dilemma: either you’re analysis is wrong or you should reject Hayek’s theory of complex phenomena.
http://e-vigilance.blogspot.com ricketson

Does it matter that our actions can influence the moral development of others? For instance, some people may oppose transfer payments because they believe that these payments encourage slothful habits and a sense of entitlement.

Even if we could empirically demonstrate that this consequence is not severe, some people may resent having their money being given to slothful people.

Kurt

Even if we could empirically demonstrate that this consequence is not severe, some people may resent having their money being given to slothful people.

For a while perhaps. Empirical evidence for the intellectual inferiority of blacks was clearly lacking by the mid-20th century. Blatant racism survived a few more generations, but is now rare and widely condemned when it does emerge. Empirical evidence may not instantly change a debate, but it does make a difference over time.

http://aaronmclin.blogspot.com/ Aaron

But, if I remember correctly, wasn’t The Bell Curve said to contain “empirical evidence for the intellectual inferiority of blacks?”

It seems to me that part of the problem with empirical evidence is just this: How does a layperson decide what’s valid and what isn’t? I’ve been told by supporters of the book that The Bell Curve has accurate information in it, and that people who dispute it have political (or politically correct) reasons for doing so. Of course, you have the book’s critics, who claim that it’s racist twaddle.

I think the idea that “empirical evidence” = “self-evidently correct evidence” while commonly held, is a fallacy; and this makes simply laying out some data and saying “okay, this proves things,” more difficult than people often think it should be.

Kurt

The overwhelming consensus of the scientific community was against the Bell Curve, primarily on the grounds that IQ tests are not known to reliably measure innate intelligence. In fact, the tendency of IQ scores to continue moving upwards suggests that such tests measure factors that correlate with quality of education. Such factors obviously would be less operative among American blacks (even today), ergo concluding that blacks are innately inferior on the basis of such tests is erroneous.

Sure, not everyone was convinced by this refutation. But the set of unconvinced non-racists at this point is probably a null set. That empirical evidence is difficult to obtain and frequently resisted by those with opposing presuppositions does not change the fact that empiricism is really the only game in town. People either play the reason and evidence game, or they’re just making shit up.

Fernando R. Tesón

Thank you for the interesting comments.
Here’s one move the progressive cannot make. First he points out, a la Rawls, that present arrangements hurt the worst-off. The libertarian shows him that deregulated markets, of all alternative arrangements, will favor the worst-off. In reply, the progressive now changes horses in the middle of the race and says: “no, no, I didn’t mean material improvement, I meant also, and more important, upholding or expressing or endorsing the right moral principles.” If the progressive’s critique of capitalism is that the poor are left behind, this can only mean that the poor are not receiving a fair share of material resources. It cannot also, or instead, mean endorsement or expression of good principles, whatever that may be.

http://aaronmclin.blogspot.com/ Aaron

Does ANY argument survive either bad faith or lack of forethought, Professor Tesón? I can trip up anyone with the proper bait-and-switch, it seems to me. I don’t know that it’s fair to define a “progressive” as someone who conceals a moral aversion to free-market capitalism (or, perhaps more accurately, a simple faith that free-market capitalism is an unworkable and/or unjust system) in a an avowed concern for the poor, in the same way that I suspect it’s unfair to define a “libertarian” as someone who conceals a moral aversion for statist policies in an avowed concern for the poor. To do so is to risk appearing to attack a straw man.

Fernando R. Tesón

Aaron: Thank you for your comment.
I didn’t define a progressive as “someone who conceals a moral aversion to free-market capitalism… in a an avowed concern for the poor.” I only said that anyone who professes to be concerned for the poor should be open-minded about which institutions better serve the poor, and not be dogmatically committed to the welfare state. In fact, Rawls starts TJ saying as much, and then goes on, inconsistently, to defend the welfare state. So, yes, there are many arguments that survive bad faith or lack of forethought. For example: “I am a progressive in the sense that I favor institutions that improve the position of the poor in absolute terms over alternative arrangements that do not do this. Should I be convinced that coercive redistribution of wealth is the most effective institution in that regard, I would support it. Should I instead be convinced that market institutions do a better job in lifting the poor, I would support those.”
By the way, I don’t know what a “moral aversion to capitalism” is. It’s like having a moral aversion to the law of gravity.

http://aaronmclin.blogspot.com/ Aaron

I haven’t read your work, so I suppose that I’m unfamiliar with the way you phrase things. But I didn’t take away from your 2:07 post an admonition against dogmatism. Instead it read much more like an indictment of “the progressive” as already being a dogmatist, and a dishonest one at that.

As for a moral aversion to capitalism, perhaps “opposition” would be a better word. Given that capitalism is simply a system of economic organization, rather than a fundamental interaction of the universe, it seems perfectly reasonable that one could oppose it on moral grounds.

http://philosophy.wvu.edu/faculty_staff/daniel_shapiro Daniel Shapiro

Hi Fernando,

No surprise, I agree with a good deal of this post, since your argument is a central theme of the first chapter of my book and of much of the argumentation in the book.

Fernando R. Tesón

Of course! I should have linked your excellent book.

Jake Brainard

I agree with much of what you are saying, Professor. I particularly appreciate the point about our boredom with empirical studies, with political science and economics. We don’t live in the abstract, we live in the actual world where these methods will help determine the best course of action. I would imagine, to a degree, that this is why the federal congress passes large, often broadly structured pieces of legislation (like those broad philosophical principles) but leaves it to agencies and the courts to figure out the practical implications. When you paint with a broad brush, you can only allow for so much before practical considerations force actors to delve into the finer details.

How closely (or not) does your argument here relate to Mill-style rule utilitarianism? It would seem that utilitarianism, while not giving us all the answers, lends itself to providing for those finer details. Perhaps the Affordable Health Care Act is the best way to achieve universal health care in this country, or perhaps a more purely free market approach would be the best path. Utilitarian considerations, practical considerations apart from some Rawlsian or Dworkinesque broad philosophical principle that just says “poverty is bad” or “it is morally good to provide health care for everyone.” Great, but how?
Good piece, thanks for sharing.

Fernando R. Tesón

Jake:
Thank you for your comment.
The position in the post is not utilitarian. It does not recommend institutions that maximize aggregate welfare. But it does recommend evaluating laws and institutions by how they impinge on people. Now the best rules may be distributively qualified (like Rawls’ difference principle) but how the principle is satisfied should be measure by how the lives of actual persons are affected. And that can only be gauged by giving enough attention to reliable social and natural sciences.

EmptyFridge

Pointy heads are not tired of empiricism. Rather, there is a consistent physics envy in the social sciences. Statistics, econometrics and historical evidence characterize too much debate. It is like playing a never ending game of hand-over-hand on a baseball bat to see who is up first. “Take that, scoundrel. See, my graph is better than your graph!”

History, all data of human action, proves nothing in itself. To get meaning from data there is a ready made theoretical framework applied. It is at this point of aprioristic reasoning that criticism needs to be directed.

Teson wrongfully includes economics as an empirical science. Here is the rub. The laws of supply and demand, comparative advantage, and the necessity of individuated property and voluntary indirect exchange facilitated by money to utilitarian material fecundity (the expansion of the division of labor), are not derived by experience.

The question of whether more stuff for more people is good or bad from a moral perspective simultaneously has to deal with whether voluntary relationships are good or bad. In other words, by claiming that less stuff is necessary for moral goodness one is also rationalizing master/slave relationships (curbing the market division of labor). Cheers

Kurt

The laws of supply and demand, comparative advantage, and the necessity of individuated property and voluntary indirect exchange facilitated by money to utilitarian material fecundity (the expansion of the division of labor), are not derived by experience.

Sure they are. You cannot discuss the laws of economics without first experiencing an economy. Even if the language of economics were a deductive perfection akin to mathematics (which is dubious), you would still have to determine when, whether and to what degree to apply that language when describing actual economic behavior — and that means empirical study. Math may have deductive purity, but you still have to determine what math properly applies to which situation. That decision has to be made on the basis of the conformance of theory to observed reality.

EmptyFridge

Well, of course. Observation, getting the data right is necessary to applied economics. But economic logic itself cannot be tested by observation. Thinking, learning, acting, choice making creatures, humans i.e., cannot conform to lab procedure or natural science forms of discovery. No human action or circumstance is repeatable.

Math is indeed elegant. And its usefulness can be observed in all the complex ways that man has been able to technically alter his/her environment. But there is no e.g. calculus of love. There is no mathematical way to measure value or a physical way to reveal the determinism in ideas. Math cannot solve the uniqueness of humans. In this sense it is economics that triumphs where math fails. Whether economics reaches the level of elegance found in math is a purely subjective evaluation. Beauty is where you find it.

John

Observation, getting the data right is necessary to applied economics. But economic logic itself cannot be tested by observation.

I’m not sure how you would make that separation. A core item of economic logic is diminishing marginal return/utility. I think that is clearly observed in human behavior one can observe on a daily basis — as well as in our own behavior.

Similarly, while it’s true I cannot know with certainty that you think in a similar way about our needs and wants It seems a reasonable assumption to impute common thought processes at least within a common culture. So my knowledge of myself will shed light on other humans and their behaviors. Is it reasonable to suggest that this hypothesis could be put to some empirical testing?

Your criteria,”No human action or circumstance is repeatable.”, also applies to every other scientific experiment if we care to look closely enough. Each orbit of the moon is different from all other orbits, same for the earth around the sun. The imperfections/variations are not so critical that we cannot derive a lot of very useful and accurate knowledge about orbits, or make very accurate predictions about future paths.

Kurt

I agree. Economics works primarily because human behavior actually is predictable. Also, any human choices (to the extent we actually make any*) occur prior to economic reasoning. Economics is how we act to achieve our preferences — but the emergence of our preferences is the realm of psychology.

* The assumption of free will is poorly supported by modern neuroscience.
John

If by choice you mean preferences I agree. If not then I think choice and the economic reasoning, in quite many — especially the more infrequent, higher cost and “important” cases, occur together.

I’ll take your work on the current state of neuroscience and free will but suspect it’s a failing of science and not will
EmptyFridge

You had to recognize the concept of diminishing returns before you could identify it by observation. This is not to say that observation doesn’t inspire discovery.

The empathetic method has some effectiveness but how do you you turn empathy into a common denominator? The human experience is one of great complexity– how do you get commonality? When one realizes that humans are about using means to attain ends introspection can begin to deductively build universals.

I guess in some sense humans and planetary bodies do share in the same cosmic determinism governing the universe. The key differences are human choice and the logical structure of the human mind. If these facts are not allowed into the discussion then it becomes one of turtles-all-the-way-down as we struggle with whether humans have free will or not.

But you must grant that there are ideas, they inform human decision making, and that no one knows their full deterministic nature.
John

You had to recognize the concept of diminishing returns before you could identify it by observation. This is not to say that observation doesn’t inspire discovery.

But it’s as likely a claim that we had to recognize the pattern before even coming up with the concept. I suspect that’s what you’re agreeing with in the second sentence. I don’t see how you’re separating these two in such a way as to set the temporal ordering you claim exists.
EmptyFridge

Kurt,
Economics is a reaction to your positivism. It makes no psychological assumptions beyond recognizing the demarcation line of voluntary v. involuntary impulse. That neuro-science comment is way ahead of its time, so to speak, too. Yes, it is true, humans anticipate the future and act accordingly. There are no studies that can be designed to measure subjective value though. Only actions, choosing one thing and setting aside another, reveal something concrete and observable. So even if you are right about the similarity in determinism between physical objects and thinking humans– you have no way of proving it through comparing minds or measuring value
EmptyFridge

I suppose you could consider that humans act to improve their situation however subjectively perceived as a psychological given.

http://bensix.wordpress.com BenSix

Everyone believes that society must do something to alleviate poverty.

Isn’t Atlas Shrugged the 2nd best-selling book in the United States? (Then again, I assume the Bible is the first and who follows that.)

http://www.psychopolitik.com b-psycho

…and for some awkward reason there’s a lot of homes with both books. Cognitive Dissonance, anyone?

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Millie Yanillie

I wonder if these same political philosophers theorized that one day our country’s government would somehow cause enough unrest that the Tea Party Movement would somehow gain a foothold in this country? Or that birthers would actually be taken seriously: http://lawblog.legalmatch.com/2011/05/03/lawyer-lessons-from-the-birther-debate/

How the heck did that happen?

Kunsthausmann

Yanillie, thanks for the link to LegalMatch. It deals with subjects that could hardly be more relevant to people who want to slap cuffs on government and, eventually, to get rid of it altogether. In fact, LegalMatch deals with economic issues, too, although I suspect that the authors there don’t understand why that is.

For example, see yesterday’s post, “We Can’t Stop the Twisters, But We Can Stop Price Gouging” by Sonja Ziaja. Supposedly price gouging is unconscionable and bad, thus government, to protect the vulnerable, should be able to compel producers and suppliers to fix prices below those which would result from voluntary action.

It so happens that provinces “like New York, are considering creating a private cause of action in these cases, allowing victims to sue to stop the price-gouging practice and to collect damages.”

Sure sounds like a nice way for lawyers to manufacture customers, doesn’t it? Of course, there are other problems, too, with price fixing.

Ziaja’s esssay would be an excellent topic for the nine bleeding hearted libertarians to show exactly what they mean by “Bleeding Heart” and to bring to bear on the topic a little economic reasoning. Probably all of them have encountered “price gouging”, so called, in their studies. I know that I did when studying economics in school, and that was at a school where Keynes is revered still and which has enough clout to get Paul Krugman to come speak to the econ department.

I suspect that Hazlitt, too, has something important to say about price increases. It should take only one lesson.

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