In Kevin’s recent post, responding to Jessica’s prior post, Kevin discusses what he calls “the paradox of toleration.”  There are actually multiple paradoxes of toleration.  Arguably, the most important of these is what we call “the paradox of liberalism” (remember we are using “liberal” with its classic meaning, not its current use in American politics).  The paradox might be framed as follows.  Persons living in a liberal state who are militantly anti-liberal should either be tolerated or not.  If tolerated, non-liberalism—which limits toleration—seems to be allowed (since those anti-liberals will be allowed to not tolerate).  If not tolerated, the state is non-liberal (as it doesn’t tolerate).  Liberalism thus seems defeated since it is a commitment to toleration, which is curtailed either way (this would hold even if, as I suspect, the liberal will tolerate non-harmful anti-liberal activity like speech acts but not harmful activity).  Liberals are committed to the broadest range of liberty and toleration possible and so the narrowest range of morally permissible interferences but, the paradox supposedly shows, this is not all that extensive.

Put bluntly, the question is: can a liberal state outlaw those seeking to end its rule?  More generally, can a regime force compliance with its principles and remain committed to those principles?  This is supposedly paradoxical for liberalism because forcing compliance means not tolerating and a liberal regime is a regime of toleration, so forcing compliance undermines the regime.  (Hence, we should call this “the paradox of regimes of toleration.”)  It is, then, the commitment to a principle of toleration (which indicates narrow limits of permissible interference) that raises the paradox.  The principle may be something like a Rawlsian principle of political legitimacy such that “the basic structure [of society] and its public policies are to be justifiable to all citizens” (Rawls 1993, 224) or something like Mill’s harm principle, which indicates that harm to others is the only reason to end toleration.  Kevin, it seems, would accept something like the former; Jessica, it seems, would accept something like the latter.  More to the point, Jessica would directly defend some objective principle of toleration while Kevin would insist that whatever principle is to be instantiated in a liberal state must be the one that emerges from public reason.

Kevin may think the paradox is especially potent against Jessica’s view: endorsement of any principle of toleration that does not emerge from public reason is tantamount to an endorsement of a conception of the good—or at least a claim that no other conception of the good is sufficient to warrant interference.  (Hence, some people now call views like Jessica’s “liberal perfectionism,” which seems like a mistake to me since there can be a comprehensive doctrine that is not about the perfection of individuals.  Given the way this debate emerged, I would call it a type of “comprehensive doctrine liberalism.”  Kevin’s view, by contrast, is nicely called “public reason liberalism.”)  But is the paradox any more problematic for CD liberalism than PR liberalism?  (Even if Kevin doesn’t think that, others do.)

Imagine a religious group R, a central belief of which is that having all act in accord with the tenets of R is required for anyone to lead a good life.  Adherents of R will reject the harm principle (and any principle that interferes with their proselytizing).  Interfering with their (perhaps forceful) proselytizing seems to require rejecting R’s claim about the good life.  It also suggests a commitment to the good life defined as including freedom of choice.  The Rawlsian principle (and, I think, the analogous principle from any PR liberalism), though apparently only procedural, actually fairs no better.  It too requires rejecting R’s claim about the good life and suggests a commitment to the good life as including freedom—freedom to live under a regime that one could reasonably endorse (for adherents of R would force their religion on others, some of whom might reasonably reject R).  There are, apparently, “limits to what public reason can accomplish” (Rawls 1999, 614).  So any advantage PR liberalism seems to have on this score is mere appearance.

Importantly, all regimes can be characterized as regimes of toleration.  They simply specify the limits of toleration differently—according to different principles of toleration.  Given that, we can see how liberals–of both stripes–can respond to the paradox.  A Christian regime wherein Jews and Moslems are tolerated but Polygamists are not, forces compliance with its principles and remains committed to them. Polygamists lose out in such a regime because they violate the regime’s principles.  This does not make the regime less Christian (in the relevant narrowly-defined way).  In a liberal regime, there is extensive toleration, but some lose out nonetheless—because they violate the regime’s principles.  For a liberal committed to the harm principle, those claiming the right to harm others will lose out.  For a liberal committed to Rawls’s principle of political legitimacy, those claiming a right to impose laws on others that those others would reject lose out.  In neither case, does this make the regime less liberal (in the relevant narrowly-defined way).  Putting the point simply, liberals—those defending extensive toleration—will not tolerate those seeking to end liberalism (they would, I think, tolerate those who merely speak of ending liberalism).  If there is a paradox here, it is worth noting (once again) that paradoxes are not contradictions and can be lived with.  Liberals–or at least some liberals–can live with the paradox of liberalism because of the objective value of toleration.  (They need not insist everyone recognize that objective value.)

So, should we be CD liberals or PR liberals?  I may post something about this in the near future.