Introduction to the Symposium on Libertarianism and Land

Eric Mack says, “a better approach to a natural rights libertarianism that would stand in contrast to left-libertarianism begins with a defense of a really basic natural moral claim of each individual not to be precluded from living his own life in his own chosen way; and this approach goes on to articulate or codify this moral claim through the ascription to each individual of certain natural rights.”
     On behalf of left-libertarianism, I would like to endorse the approach that Mack advocates and say that this looks like a good starting point from which to reach additional agreements among libertarians of the left and right.  One of the things that recommends equal land rights to left libertarians is the role of land rights in ensuring that each individual is not “precluded from living his own life in his own chosen way.”  Whatever life a person chooses to live, some land will be needed.  While it is true that a competitive market in land rights will allow a person to acquire land rights by trading his labor, there are some places in the world where land rights are so concentrated that those who have land rights have dictatorial powers over those who do not.  So all libertarians need to ensure that no one is precluded from having some access to land on which he can live his life in his own chosen way.
     Mack says, “As far as I can see, there is a striking dearth of arguments offered to move us from disbelief to belief in an original and equal right to the land.”  I would direct Mack and other interested readers to the argument that Bruce Ackerman makes in Social Justice in the Liberal State.  Ackerman postulates that 1) anyone who exercises power has an obligation to explain, to anyone who asks, why it is just that he exercises the power that he does, that 2) explanations of different powers must not be inconsistent with one another and that 3) no reason that purports to justify the exercise of power is adequate if it entails an assumption that the person exercising power is better than others or that his conception of the good is better than those of others.  Then, Ackerman points out, a person can justify a claim to power over an equal share of land on the ground that he is at least as good as anyone else, and that therefore he ought to have as much land as anyone else, with which to pursue his personal conception of the good.  Thus a person who takes care not to claim more land than others can claim (or who compensates persons with below-average claims if his claim is above average) has a way of justifying his claim to the land that he uses that is not available to those who claim more than others can claim. 
     Mack asks what is meant by “equal shares.”  The answer lies in the rental market for unimproved land.  Within a political jurisdiction, the market rent of unimproved land specifies the total value available and therefore what each person can claim.  Across jurisdictions, one should look not at unimproved land (vacant lots), but rather at what the rental value of land would be if it were not developed, so that the value of infrastructure and on-going economic activity is assigned to the individual political jurisdiction and not to a larger community.  Each political jurisdiction has a respectable claim to the land that it occupies if the pre-development rental value of its land is no greater, per capita, than all other jurisdictions can claim, or if it compensates jurisdictions with below-average claims.  When the use of land entails any form of depletion, the depletion of value must be included in the claim that must be justified.