This is an overly-long post that gets to a simple answer to a question that sometimes comes up in the sorts of discussions we have on this blog. If you like, skip the next 2 paragraphs to get right to the question.

There are historically important theorists that thought of the state as something above and beyond the individuals that live within its territory. When Rousseau spoke of a “General Will,” he meant something in some way distinct from the wills of individuals. He talks of “a single moving power” that “is a real unity of them all in one and the same person,” “a moral and collective body.” For Hegel, the state is an “organism,” and “God on earth.” Few today would use such loaded language, but there are still many who seem to think the state or society is something other than just the collection of individual persons that make it up and the rules they use to interact with one another (most of which are determined by convention).

Similarly, there was significant work in the 1980s from political philosophers claiming that community (rather then the state or society) was–in some way never clearly specified–metaphysically prior to the individuals within it. Like Rousseau and Hegel, these thinkers thought there was something “above and beyond” the individuals. For my part, communities, societies, and states are simply the individuals that make them up and the rules they interact with in the relevant group.

A recent question in this forum was: how should we address those that think the state is something more than a collection of individuals? Indeed, how do we address those that think the community or society is something more than that?

The seemingly obvious claim that absent individuals, the group would not exist, but that won’t convince anyone. Arguably, groups also “constitute” individuals. What that claim means is itself ambiguous. I’ve tried to clarify the possible meanings elsewhere. Here, though, I think we should realize–and encourage those we argue with to realize–that this question is not what matters politically. What matters politically is whether the state, society, or community should have any moral standing apart from that of the individuals within it. We can ask if the group (state, society, community, or whatever) has moral rights, has interests that should be taken into account when making policy decisions, or should get any weight of any sort in any moral calculous. I think the answers to these questions are clear, but some will not.

I think we can make headway here by asking the advocate of the group’s claim to moral standing if they would prefer (A) a society that was wealthy and militarily strong though all of individuals therein were miserably unhappy or (B) a society that had relatively little wealth or military power but wherein all individuals were genuinely happy. If they select (A), I regretfully suggest giving up the debate. It seems to me a ludicrous view, but some may hold it. I suspect most will go with (B). If your interlocutor accepts (B) you’ve made the important point: what matters is individuals. As Mill claims, “The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it.” That and nothing else.