Obviously each of these following steps would need more explication and defense than I’m giving here. The picture is also a bit oversimplified, since (for one thing) it concerns reciprocal determination between just two virtues rather than among them all. But it will help to fill in a bit the picture I sketched in my earlier post.

1. The prima facie content of benevolence is consequentialist. [Note: for present purposes, the difference principle counts as consequentialist.]

2. The form of consequentialism best answering to benevolence’s prima facie content will be some sort of rule-consequentialism (for familiar Humean/Hayekian reasons).

3.The prima facie content of justice is deontological.

4. The form of deontology best answering to justice’s prima facie content will be a self-ownership principle.

5. Because property rights, qua rights, are enforceable, and self-ownership rules out any use of force except in defense of self-ownership, the only system of property rights consistent with self-ownership will be one that treats property as an extension of the self (and so the conception of the self, in order to be consistent with self-ownership and property rights, must be construed so as to make this possible).

6. When property is treated as an extension of the self, a principle of self-ownership will render such rights highly stringent.

7. Although benevolence’s prima facie content is consequentialist, there are considerations internal to benevolence (e.g., respect) that push it toward reconciliation with deontic justice.

8. Although justice’s prima facie content is deontological, there are considerations internal to justice (e.g., fairness) that push it toward reconciliation with consequentialist benevolence.

9. If the gap between the prima facie contents of self-ownership and rule-consequentialism is large and/or likely to be found in normal situations, the extent to which self-ownership needs to be revised will be greater and more structural.

10. If the gap between the prima facie contents of self-ownership and rule-consequentialism is small and/or likely to be found only in abnormal situations, the extent to which self-ownership needs to be revised will be small and mainly a matter of temporary exceptions.

11. We know from libertarian economic and social theory (and in particular, a synthesis of Austrian, agorist, and mutualist theory) that the gap between self-ownership (together with stringent property rights) and most plausible versions of rule-consequentialism [including the difference principle] is small and/or likely to be found only in abnormal situations.

12. Thus the content of justice after conciliation with benevolence will still be essentially a form of self-ownership (together with stringent property rights), albeit with a few small revisions and temporary exceptions.