A few quick responses to Kevin’s very interesting reply to my criticisms of his views.

First, and for the record, my posts did not mention public justification, internalism, or externalism (terms I don’t even fully understand). And I also did not assert that very same arguments that justify other liberal rights also justify property. So I did not assert the argument Kevin attributes to me. Maybe I would endorse those premises (if I knew what they meant and thought carefully about it), but they were not the point of those posts.

So what was the point? Kevin wrote that property rights are problematic because they are coercive and authoritative. I objected that this is not a good reason for distinguishing between property rights and other rights, because we can say the same about those other rights too. Kevin responded by writing about how property is “kinda different.” I agree that it is. But note that the reasons for which they are different (as stated by Kevin) have nothing to do with these rights being coercive or authoritative. They have to do with property not being connected to our bodies, etc. Think of that what you will, but we’ve clearly shifted ground.

That said, I think one important difference between Kevin and myself has become clear. I think it’s easier to extend the arguments that help justify standard liberal rights to help justify property rights. Fans of autonomy, for example, often ignore how important robust forms of ownership (including ownership of productive property) is for enabling our autonomous action. But that’s a topic for another day.