This is the third, though much delayed, post in a series that explain a little of what I try to do in my recent book, Toleration. The first post is here; the second is here.

I ended the second post by indicating that endorsing the strict version of the harm principle—the principle that harm (understood as wrongful setback to interests) and only harm justifies interference—is conducive to bleeding heart libertarianism. Indeed, I take the strict version of the harm principle to be true and take it to undergird my BHL. It leads me to views on a variety of issues that might not seem standard for libertarianism. So, in this post I want to look at some things people might not think of when discussing the harm principle or libertarianism. These are considered in somewhat more detail in the book.

First: Children. It should be obvious that children have interests and that these can wrongfully set back. It should also be obvious that children will not always know their interests. A child is a sentient being and like all sentient beings, has an interest in not suffering. A child also has an interest in adequate nutrition. Young children are unlikely to recognize this. An infant may not realize it has an interest in food at all. A toddler may realize he has an interest in food but think he has an interest in eating only cupcakes and soda. Perhaps he has such an interest, but he also has an interest in eating more nutritious food, whether he knows it or not. A parent that maliciously feeds his child only candy corn and soda because he is curious about how this will affect a human life harms his child. As such, the strict version of the harm principle indicates interference is permissible. More obviously, a parent who throws boiling water on his child or who rapes his child, harms the child and the harm principle indicates interference is warranted. Importantly, it seems to me that the question we should ask is not merely “can we interfere if a parent harms a child?” (We can and, at least where the harm is severe, should.) We should ask “how can we prevent children from being (severely) harmed in the first place?” I won’t try to answer that here, but see this. I suspect I will have another post about that topic in a few weeks.

Second: Animals. I can see no good reason to deny that animals have interests, nor that such interests can be wrongfully setback. That is, I can see no reason to deny that animals can be harmed. If that is right, interference with the perpetrators of such harm is permissible according to the harm principle. This is not, of course, to say that we must all be vegetarians or vegans. That animals can have interests wrongfully set back, after all, does not mean that every set back to an animal’s interests is wrongful. Some killing of animals is likely not wrongful at all and hence not a harm in the relevant sense. Indeed, some killing of some animals is likely not even a setback to the animal’s interests. Killing animals in a way that is designed to cause them suffering is likely a wrongful (major) setback to their interests. Killing them without causing them any suffering may not set back any interests and may not be wrongful. If either of those is the case, killing them without causing them any suffering is not harming them. Hence, killing them in that way would not warrant interference according to the strict version of the harm principle. Torturing them would. Other cases would require more discussion. Perhaps of interest here, though, none of this requires thinking of animals as rights bearers—but nor need it be a part of a utilitarian view.

Third: The Environment. I assume the environment has no interests in anything—except in some very loose metaphorical sense. It is a thing, not a subject. Lamps have no interests, though we may have interests in lamps. Similarly, of course, we may (do!) have interests in the environment, but it has no interests. As such, it has no interests that can be wrongfully setback. It thus cannot be harmed. On the other hand, as is widely agreed, one can damage the environment in a way that leaves other creatures—including humans—with interests set back, sometimes wrongfully. If Paul the paper mill owner dumps his waste chemicals into a river, poisoning it and making it impossible for downstream Larry to grow his crops, Paul sets back Larry’s interests and does so wrongfully—imposing his costs on Larry, who did not agree to absorb them. Negative externalities are, or at least often are, harms. This means that interference with Paul’s dumping is permissible. What sort of interference is permitted is an open question. Tort law may be sufficient, or environmental regulation may be required. I take no stand on that here. My point is only that even the strict version of the harm principle would permit interference.

I’ll stop here. In my next, and likely last, post about the book, I will look at what the harm principle might say about cultural and international issues as well as the business world.