Interesting article in the NY Times about the so-called “argumentative theory of reasoning.” The claim, in a nutshell, seems to be that reason developed evolutionarily in order to allow us to win arguments (get people to do what we want, etc.). I’m frankly not sure what would even count as evidence for such a view, but I am no expert and have not read this literature at all. I just thought I’d make three comments, perhaps from a point of too much ignorance (so be forgiving!).

First, the authors discussed in the article (Sperber and Mercier) are quoted (perhaps wrongly) as saying that “At least in some cultural contexts, this results in a kind of arms race towards greater sophistication in the production and evaluation of arguments … When people are motivated to reason, they do a better job at accepting only sound arguments, which is quite generally to their advantage.” OK, maybe it is to their advantage, but doesn’t the rest of the quote indicate that some are just better at getting to the truth? Doesn’t that matter? Put differently, even if reason did evolve so that we can win arguments, is it really just a coincidence that this means reason is likely to lead to truth? If its not just a coincidence, does the evolution of reason matter? (I mean that morally; I can see the obvious intellectual interest in understanding where we and our abilities come from. I can also predict, unfortunately, poor political argumentation emerging: “Oh, I see that you want to use that weapon, reason, again, to convince me to do X, but I know enough not to let you get away with it, so I won’t listen to reason.” Admittedly, this may be nothing more then a worry about journalistic popularization of science.)

In any case–this is the second comment–we all have had arguments with people that seemed only interested in winning a point. The article rightly gestures at judicial law as an area where this is (often) the case, but its obviously true in other areas as well. Still, some of us genuinely argue–with ourselves and others–to get to the truth. Does anyone really deny this? Some might, but what is the evidence? Wouldn’t this require some claim of false consciousness for those of us that see ourselves as pursuing truth?

Third and final point: this view is apparently thought to support a form of deliberative democracy (Rawlsian or Habermasian) as a way of overcoming polarizing debate. I find this confusing. A theory about how reason develops doesn’t (necessarily) entail anything about how we use it, but this suggestion seems to assume it does. It seems to assume that we use reason to further only our own interests. Hence, it is claimed (if I understand this correctly), that we need a way to get past our individual interests to work together–and deliberative democracy is meant to serve this purpose. So, we supposedly reason in order to win arguments, but when we get together and debate in a group, we don’t? (Seems to contradict the view.) Or is the thought that somehow we all win? (Seems absurd.) Or that we agree to compromise? (In which case, isn’t there some value other then winning that is at play?)